THE STORY OF JULIUS KAMBARAGE NYERERE, 1953 PART THREE

The Story of Julius Kambarage Nyerere, 1953

Nyerere, Rupia and Bi. Titi Mohamed

The elders were approached. They were told why the TAA leadership had accepted Nyerere. TAA was being transformed into an open mass movement. Abdulwahid told the elders, among whom were sheikhs that, the country was entering the last phase of the struggle and that needed the support of every Tanganyika African irrespective of religion or ethnic identity. The elders were TAA members but they also belonged to their own tribal groups such as the Batetera Union of the Manyema led by Mzee bin Sudi, and the Zaramo Union under the leadership of Makisi Mbwana. Some members were also active in Al Jamiatul Islamiyya fi Tanganyika. Abdulwahid told the elders that the TAA was headquarters were in great need of their open support, and in particular, the highly educated African leaders such as Julius Nyerere who were close to the colonial state.

The elders consented and began to build Nyerere’s image as the unifying force of all Africans.  A student of Mufti Sheikh Hassan bin Amir recalls to have seen Abdulwahid, Dossa Aziz and Nyerere on several occasions in early 1950s coming to see the sheikh at his madras in Kariakoo on Amani Street, house no. 36. Usually when Abdulwahid, Dossa Aziz and Nyerere went to see him, Mufti Sheikh Hassan Bin Amir would dismiss his students and consultations would take place there, inside the madras, with the young men sitting cross-legged before him. Other prominent elders were Sheikh Suleiman Takadir, nicknamed ‘Makarious,’ a well learned Muslim scholar; Mohamed Jumbe Tambaza, a landowner; Mshumi Kiyate, a well-to-do fishmonger; Mwinjuma Mwinyikambi, owner of huge tracts of land planted with coconut and mango trees; Rajab Diwani, a simple carpenter but gifted orator; Makisi Mbwana, leader of the Zaramo community in Dar es Salaam; Sheikh Haidari Mwinyimvua, a simple tailor and a man of integrity; Idd Faizi Mafongo and Idd Tosiri two Manyema brothers, cousins to Sheikh Mohamed Ramia of Bagamoyo, the Khalifa of Tariqa Qadiriya. Idd Tosiri was an active member as was Idd Tulio, a respectable elder; and Mashado Ramadhan Plantan, editor and proprietor of Zuhra, and his brother Schneider Abdillah Plantan, distant relatives to the Sykes brothers.

That was the turning point in the political history of Tanganyika. The executive committee of the association, with the exception of Julius Nyerere and Abdulwahid, virtually lost all power as the Muslim elders literally took over the movement. Gradually Abdulwahid would also come to lose his grip on the movement particularly after forming TANU, so as to leave Nyerere and the leadership from the provinces to lead Tanganyika to independence.  Having overcome the obstacle of non-acceptance of Nyerere, Abdulwahid and Nyerere settled down to the serious business of the association.

In June, TAA headquarters announced its executive committee with J.K. Nyerere, President; Abdulwahid Sykes, Vice-President; J.P. Kasella Bantu, General Secretary; Alexander M. Tobias and Waziri Dossa Aziz, Joint Minuting Secretary; John Rupia, Treasurer and Ally K. Sykes as Assistant Treasurer. Committee members were Dr Michael Lugazia, Hamisi Diwani, Tewa Said, Denis Phombeah, Z. James, Dome Okochi, C. Ongalo and Patrick Aoko.[1] The composition of the TAA leadership showed East African solidarity that existed during the struggle for independence. Kenyan patriots were elected as office bearers side by side with Tanganyikans. It is said that it was about that time, in the last months of 1953, that Abdulwahid talked to Nyerere seriously about forming an open political party to replace TAA.

The Association had reorganised its administrative machinery at the headquarters and had included several Kenyan nationalists in its executive committee. This had a special significance to the colonial government. The political situation in Kenya was tense. Mau Mau was having skirmishes with government troops. On 20 th October, 1952, the colonial government in Kenya, failing to control Mau Mau guerilla activities, declared a state of emergency. Kenyatta and the entire KAU leadership were arrested and detained. On 8 th April, 1953, they were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The inclusion of Kenyan nationalists in the TAA leadership was, therefore, a cause of concern to the colonial governments in East Africa and TAA was, as a result, closely watched. The Kenyan nationalists were all considered Mau Mau suspects. [2] Whether the Special Branch was also aware that Abdulwahid had made contact and met the Mau Mau leadership in 1950 is still open to speculation. But if one is to go by the belief that TAA’s confidential files were surrendered to the colonial government at a price by one of its executive staff, one can conclude that Abdulwahid’s contact with Kenyatta was known to the government. We shall return later to discuss this episode.

Nyerere had barely finished reading Abdulwahid’s handover notes when, on 1 August, 1953, the colonial administration published Government Circular No. 5 banning African civil servants from politics. [3]  Legally, of course, there was no political party in Tanganyika. The Governor did not need to go to the Registrar of Societies to check the simple fact; it was known the Africans in Tanganyika had not gone beyond formation of welfare associations. But the government was forced to react in the way it did because of developments after 1950 when the Makerere intellectuals took over the TAA. The government decided to react against TAA because it was aware of its political character. Since 1950 when Abdulwahid and Dr Kyaruzi assumed power, TAA headquarters began to capitalize on the social discontent in the country in order to legitimise its own existence in the eyes of the people of Tanganyika.

The formation of the Political Sub-Committee in TAA, its involvement in the Constitutional Development Committee of Governor Edward Twining and in its submission of proposals to the government and its conduct in the Meru Land Case smacked of behaviour typical of political organisations.  The colonial government was also aware that Mwapachu was in contact with the Fabian Society and was contributing radical articles to The Sentinel and was exchanging correspondence with ultra-leftists of the Labour Party in Britain.  In his capacity as the secretary of TAGSA, Ally Sykes had established contact with the Secretary-General of the Pan African Congress of Northern Rhodesia, Kenneth David Kaunda. [4]  Abdulwahid had met the Indian High Commissioner to East Africa in Nairobi in 1950 in his official capacity as secretary of TAA. The colonial government was probably aware that since 1950 Abdulwahid and Ally were in constant contact with the Asia Socialist Conference and its Anti-Colonial Bureau. This behaviour by the Association and its leadership had transformed it into a de facto political party.

By the time Nyerere was taking over leadership of TAA, Governor Edward Twining had ample evidence of TAA’s involvement in politics and the circular which the government had issued was to check this new development. Up to that moment no one could accuse Nyerere of meddling in politics, even with his election as president of the TAA. If the government had wanted it could have interdicted almost the entire leadership, save Nyerere and a few others, and banned TAA. The circular therefore threatened the very existence of the association and its direction. Most of the educated Africans who were in the civil service left the Association. Remaining close to Abdulwahid, Nyerere and TAA were a few die-hards-Ally Sykes, Dossa Aziz and John Rupia.

Abdulwahid risked losing his job as Market Master at the Kariakoo Market.  Being a missionary employee, Julius Nyerere ironically, was not affected by the circular, although as we shall see later, his leadership of the popular mass movement was in contradiction to the stand of the Church on the African politics. The political movement which had existed in Abdulwahid’s mind from the end of the World War II when he was in Burma serving under the British command faced premature death. It was obvious to Abdulwahid that the TAA leadership and the future of Tanganyika  faced a do-or-die situation. They could either succumb to threats and nip the movement in the bud, or stand up against the government and face whatever would be the consequences. After assessing the political climate and making the necessary consultations with the TAA inner circle, (Abdulwahid, Ally, Tewa,  Dossa, Rupia,  Nyerere and the elders), TAA leadership at the headquarters resolved to stand up to the colonial government. In an unprecedented gesture, TAA declared itself a political party working for the development of the people of Tanganyika. Further more, it called for a dialogue with the colonial government. TAA President Julius Nyerere wrote  a letter to Governor Edward Twining which in part read:

...the vast majority of the educated Africans in this territory are in the Civil Service and banning them from membership of political organisations is equivalent to banning the Tanganyika African Association, the only political organisation in the Territory. This, Your Excellency, is a serious blow to our political development.  [5]

Governor Twining must have been startled by Nyerere’s letter and the initiative to call for a dialogue between the government and TAA. Within seven days Twining wrote back to Nyerere informing him that he would grant an interview to a TAA delegation.[6] This was a complete change to the response which TAA had been receiving from the government for many years. Governor Twining had probably read the signs of the times. The colonial goverment could no longer afford to ignore TAA. The government was put in a situation in which there was only one line of action open. It could allow open political organisation in Tanganyika and avert a crisis, or ban political activities and face violent resistance as experienced in 1947 and 1950 by the port labour movement. That situation could also deteriorate to what the government was facing in Kenya where KAU was banned, all political activities suspended and the state of emergency declared.

From the Moshi TAA branch, Joseph Kimalando, a middle-aged veteran politician who was the association’s secretary wrote to headquarters:

... the content of your circular letter of 10 th August ultimo was laid before the meeting and the audience decided to support the headquarters in any form you may consider desirable, and if your intending interview does not achieve the desired objective, we shall have to represent the matter to Her Majesty’s Government.  [7]

---

     [1]Tanganyika Standard, 19 th June 1953.

  [2]Soon after the formation of TANU, the Kenyans were arrested and deported back to Kenya where they were detained on Lamu Island in Manyani.

     [3]Tanganyika, Members of Political Association, Tanganyika Government Circular No. 5 (1 st August, 1953), Dar es Salaam, 1953. 

     [4]          K.D. Kaunda to A.K. Sykes, 28 th December, 1953. Sykes’Papers.

     [5]Julius K. Nyerere, President Tanganyika African Association to Governor Edward Twining, 10 th August, 1953. Sykes’ Papers.

     [6]Secretariat letter 16797/11/343 of August, 1953. Sykes’ Papers.

     [7]          Joseph Kimalando to the Hon. General Secretary, 9 September, 1953. ‘Government Circular on Membership of Political Associations’, Party Archives Dodoma. File 168, Folio 2.

The elders were approached. They were told why the TAA leadership had accepted Nyerere. TAA was being transformed into an open mass movement. Abdulwahid told the elders, among whom were sheikhs that, the country was entering the last phase of the struggle and that needed the support of every Tanganyika African irrespective of religion or ethnic identity. The elders were TAA members but they also belonged to their own tribal groups such as the Batetera Union of the Manyema led by Mzee bin Sudi, and the Zaramo Union under the leadership of Makisi Mbwana. Some members were also active in Al Jamiatul Islamiyya fi Tanganyika. Abdulwahid told the elders that the TAA was headquarters were in great need of their open support, and in particular, the highly educated African leaders such as Julius Nyerere who were close to the colonial state.

The elders consented and began to build Nyerere’s image as the unifying force of all Africans.  A student of Mufti Sheikh Hassan bin Amir recalls to have seen Abdulwahid, Dossa Aziz and Nyerere on several occasions in early 1950s coming to see the sheikh at his madras in Kariakoo on Amani Street, house no. 36. Usually when Abdulwahid, Dossa Aziz and Nyerere went to see him, Mufti Sheikh Hassan Bin Amir would dismiss his students and consultations would take place there, inside the madras, with the young men sitting cross-legged before him. Other prominent elders were Sheikh Suleiman Takadir, nicknamed ‘Makarious,’ a well learned Muslim scholar; Mohamed Jumbe Tambaza, a landowner; Mshumi Kiyate, a well-to-do fishmonger; Mwinjuma Mwinyikambi, owner of huge tracts of land planted with coconut and mango trees; Rajab Diwani, a simple carpenter but gifted orator; Makisi Mbwana, leader of the Zaramo community in Dar es Salaam; Sheikh Haidari Mwinyimvua, a simple tailor and a man of integrity; Idd Faizi Mafongo and Idd Tosiri two Manyema brothers, cousins to Sheikh Mohamed Ramia of Bagamoyo, the Khalifa of Tariqa Qadiriya. Idd Tosiri was an active member as was Idd Tulio, a respectable elder; and Mashado Ramadhan Plantan, editor and proprietor of Zuhra, and his brother Schneider Abdillah Plantan, distant relatives to the Sykes brothers.

That was the turning point in the political history of Tanganyika. The executive committee of the association, with the exception of Julius Nyerere and Abdulwahid, virtually lost all power as the Muslim elders literally took over the movement. Gradually Abdulwahid would also come to lose his grip on the movement particularly after forming TANU, so as to leave Nyerere and the leadership from the provinces to lead Tanganyika to independence.  Having overcome the obstacle of non-acceptance of Nyerere, Abdulwahid and Nyerere settled down to the serious business of the association.        

In June, TAA headquarters announced its executive committee with J.K. Nyerere, President; Abdulwahid Sykes, Vice-President; J.P. Kasella Bantu, General Secretary; Alexander M. Tobias and Waziri Dossa Aziz, Joint Minuting Secretary; John Rupia, Treasurer and Ally K. Sykes as Assistant Treasurer. Committee members were Dr Michael Lugazia, Hamisi Diwani, Tewa Said, Denis Phombeah, Z. James, Dome Okochi, C. Ongalo and Patrick Aoko.[1] The composition of the TAA leadership showed East African solidarity that existed during the struggle for independence. Kenyan patriots were elected as office bearers side by side with Tanganyikans. It is said that it was about that time, in the last months of 1953, that Abdulwahid talked to Nyerere seriously about forming an open political party to replace TAA.

The Association had reorganised its administrative machinery at the headquarters and had included several Kenyan nationalists in its executive committee. This had a special significance to the colonial government. The political situation in Kenya was tense. Mau Mau was having skirmishes with government troops. On 20 th October, 1952, the colonial government in Kenya, failing to control Mau Mau guerilla activities, declared a state of emergency. Kenyatta and the entire KAU leadership were arrested and detained. On 8 th April, 1953, they were sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment with hard labour. The inclusion of Kenyan nationalists in the TAA leadership was, therefore, a cause of concern to the colonial governments in East Africa and TAA was, as a result, closely watched. The Kenyan nationalists were all considered Mau Mau suspects. [2] Whether the Special Branch was also aware that Abdulwahid had made contact and met the Mau Mau leadership in 1950 is still open to speculation. But if one is to go by the belief that TAA’s confidential files were surrendered to the colonial government at a price by one of its executive staff, one can conclude that Abdulwahid’s contact with Kenyatta was known to the government. We shall return later to discuss this episode.

Nyerere had barely finished reading Abdulwahid’s handover notes when, on 1 August, 1953, the colonial administration published Government Circular No. 5 banning African civil servants from politics. [3]  Legally, of course, there was no political party in Tanganyika. The Governor did not need to go to the Registrar of Societies to check the simple fact; it was known the Africans in Tanganyika had not gone beyond formation of welfare associations. But the government was forced to react in the way it did because of developments after 1950 when the Makerere intellectuals took over the TAA. The government decided to react against TAA because it was aware of its political character. Since 1950 when Abdulwahid and Dr Kyaruzi assumed power, TAA headquarters began to capitalize on the social discontent in the country in order to legitimise its own existence in the eyes of the people of Tanganyika.

The formation of the Political Sub-Committee in TAA, its involvement in the Constitutional Development Committee of Governor Edward Twining and in its submission of proposals to the government and its conduct in the Meru Land Case smacked of behaviour typical of political organisations.  The colonial government was also aware that Mwapachu was in contact with the Fabian Society and was contributing radical articles to The Sentinel and was exchanging correspondence with ultra-leftists of the Labour Party in Britain.  In his capacity as the secretary of TAGSA, Ally Sykes had established contact with the Secretary-General of the Pan African Congress of Northern Rhodesia, Kenneth David Kaunda. [4]  Abdulwahid had met the Indian High Commissioner to East Africa in Nairobi in 1950 in his official capacity as secretary of TAA. The colonial government was probably aware that since 1950 Abdulwahid and Ally were in constant contact with the Asia Socialist Conference and its Anti-Colonial Bureau. This behaviour by the Association and its leadership had transformed it into a de facto political party.

By the time Nyerere was taking over leadership of TAA, Governor Edward Twining had ample evidence of TAA’s involvement in politics and the circular which the government had issued was to check this new development. Up to that moment no one could accuse Nyerere of meddling in politics, even with his election as president of the TAA. If the government had wanted it could have interdicted almost the entire leadership, save Nyerere and a few others, and banned TAA. The circular therefore threatened the very existence of the association and its direction. Most of the educated Africans who were in the civil service left the Association. Remaining close to Abdulwahid, Nyerere and TAA were a few die-hards-Ally Sykes, Dossa Aziz and John Rupia.

Abdulwahid risked losing his job as Market Master at the Kariakoo Market.  Being a missionary employee, Julius Nyerere ironically, was not affected by the circular, although as we shall see later, his leadership of the popular mass movement was in contradiction to the stand of the Church on the African politics. The political movement which had existed in Abdulwahid’s mind from the end of the World War II when he was in Burma serving under the British command faced premature death. It was obvious to Abdulwahid that the TAA leadership and the future of Tanganyika  faced a do-or-die situation. They could either succumb to threats and nip the movement in the bud, or stand up against the government and face whatever would be the consequences. After assessing the political climate and making the necessary consultations with the TAA inner circle, (Abdulwahid, Ally, Tewa,  Dossa, Rupia,  Nyerere and the elders), TAA leadership at the headquarters resolved to stand up to the colonial government. In an unprecedented gesture, TAA declared itself a political party working for the development of the people of Tanganyika. Further more, it called for a dialogue with the colonial government. TAA President Julius Nyerere wrote  a letter to Governor Edward Twining which in part read:

...the vast majority of the educated Africans in this territory are in the Civil Service and banning them from membership of political organisations is equivalent to banning the Tanganyika African Association, the only political organisation in the Territory. This, Your Excellency, is a serious blow to our political development.  [5]    

Governor Twining must have been startled by Nyerere’s letter and the initiative to call for a dialogue between the government and TAA. Within seven days Twining wrote back to Nyerere informing him that he would grant an interview to a TAA delegation.[6] This was a complete change to the response which TAA had been receiving from the government for many years. Governor Twining had probably read the signs of the times. The colonial goverment could no longer afford to ignore TAA. The government was put in a situation in which there was only one line of action open. It could allow open political organisation in Tanganyika and avert a crisis, or ban political activities and face violent resistance as experienced in 1947 and 1950 by the port labour movement. That situation could also deteriorate to what the government was facing in Kenya where KAU was banned, all political activities suspended and the state of emergency declared. 

From the Moshi TAA branch, Joseph Kimalando, a middle-aged veteran politician who was the association’s secretary wrote to headquarters:

... the content of your circular letter of 10 th August ultimo was laid before the meeting and the audience decided to support the headquarters in any form you may consider desirable, and if your intending interview does not achieve the desired objective, we shall have to represent the matter to Her Majesty’s Government.  [7]